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DRUG-IMPAIRED POLICE OFFICERS/FIRE FIGHTERS
AND THE REASONABLE SUSPICION STANDARD:
WHOSE TURN IS IT TO GIVE CONDOLENCES
TO THE INNOCENT VICTIM'S
FAMILY?
INTRODUCTION
Scenario:' A woman and child are being held hostage at gunpoint. A police
officer has a gun pointed at the armed felon. The officer's hands begin to tremble,
and he becomes increasingly paranoid.2 The felon decides to surrender and begins
to place his gun down. However, the officer misperceives this conduct and shoots
- accidently killing the child.
One court has held that the probability of losing one life is not comparable to
the probability of losing thousands of lives as is the case with impaired nuclear plant
employees and air traffic controllers.3 Apparently, courts and commentators
advocating this view believe that it is better for one child to die than to invade a police
officer's privacy by requiring him to submit to random drug testing.
Ironically, in constitutional analysis, commentators constantly argue for the
protection of one person's rights, even though the rights of countless others may be
jeopardized. Drug-impaired fire fighters can be a risk to themselves, fellow fire
fighters, and the people who depend on them for rescue.' However, many courts and
commentators simply take note of these risks, and then conclude that the fire
fighter's rights outweigh the potential violation of countless individuals' rights.
Again, ironically, the courts continue to resist the idea of mandatory drug
testing even though the public seems to be in favor of it.5 President Reagan declared
war on drugs, and issued Executive Order No. 12,564 to initiate drug testing
programs for employees in "sensitive" positions.6 Drugs and their related problems
The number of possible hypothetical situations involving drug-impaired police officers and fire fighters is
innumerable.
2 Drugs can lead to several adverse results including paranoia, hallucinations, and confusion. R. ASHLEY,
COCAINE: ITS HISTORY, USES & EITEcTS 155 (1975).
3 Lovvom v. City of Chattanooga, Tenn., 846 F.2d 1539, 1547 (6th Cir.), vacated, 861 F.2d 1388 (6th Cir.
1988).
4 id. at 1544.
1 Comment, "Drug Testing of Government Employees Should Not Be a Matter of Fourth Amendment
Concern" Cries a Lone Voice in a Wilderness of Opposition, 1987 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1239, 1268.
6 Exec. Order No. 12,564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32,889 (1986); "sensitive positions" refer to people "with access
to sensitive information [creating] the possibility of coercion, influence, and irresponsible action under
pressure that may pose a serious risk to national security, the public safety, and the effective enforcement of
the law." Id.
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constantly appear in newspapers and magazines. Theater ads feature celebrities
advising kids not to use drugs - because drugs kill. One television commercial7
portrays a frying pan and an egg symbolizing a person's brain on drugs. Still many
courts and commentators apparently believe that a public employee should not be
required to submit to drug testing - at least until a "reasonable suspicion" arises.8
The saying, "Guns do not kill people. People kill people" is true. However,
many courts and commentators constantly urge that police officers (who are required
to carry guns at all times, both on-duty and off-duty) 9 should not be subjected to drug
testing in the absence of a "reasonable suspicion." 0 Once a child is dead, all courts
would probably agree that a "reasonable suspicion" exists. Presently, society
merely gives its condolences to the dead child's family because the courts are
unwilling to ensure that police officers are drug-free before any tragic event occurs.
Part I of this comment will provide a brief overview of the general constitu-
tional concerns of random drug testing. Part II will discuss random drug testing as
applied to police officers and fire fighters. Part III will begin by addressing the
public/private employer distinction, and the balancing of the conflicting interests.
Part III will end by discussing the effects of drugs, the deterrent effect of drug testing
programs, and the costs associated with employee drug use.
PART I
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RANDOM DRUG TESTING OF PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES IN GENERAL
The general constitutional concerns regarding random drug testing of public
employees have been extensively and exhaustively reviewed by commentators."
This comment has nothing to add in this area, but will provide a brief overview in
order for the reader to better understand the remainder of this comment.
The principal constitutional concern regarding random drug testing is the
protection of the rights guaranteed by the fourth amendment. 2 Courts have often
concluded that random drug testing 3 constitutes a "search" under the fourth
This television commercial is sponsored by the Partnership For A Drug-Free America.
8 Lovvorn, 846 F.2d at 1547.
9 See, e.g., Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n of N.J., Local 318 v. Wash. Township, 850 F.2d 133, 139-41 (3d
Cir. 1988).
'0 See, e.g., Lovvorn, 846 F.2d 1539; Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F.Supp. 245 (N.D.Ga. 1986); Turner v
Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. 1985); Penny v. Kennedy, 648 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Tenn.
1986), aff d, 846 F.2d 1563 (6th Cir. 1988).
1 See, e.g., Comment, supra note 5; Ayers, Constitutional Issues Implicated by Public Employee Drug
Testing, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 337 (1988).
12 For an overview of other constitutional concerns (specifically due process, right to privacy, and privilege
against self-incrimination) See Ayers, supra note 11, at 356-58.
"3 For an interesting classification and analysis of the different types of drug testing, See Ayers, supra note
[Vol. 22:4
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amendment 4 (the fourteenth amendment applies the fourth amendment to the
states).'" The more controversial question centers around determining whether such
a search is "unreasonable" because the fourth amendment only protects against un-
reasonable searches and seizures.16 Determining reasonableness requires a balanc-
ing of the intrusiveness of the search against the governmental need for the search. 7
Two of the most controversial aspects of urinalysis 18 are: "(1) a urinalysis
may reveal physiological secrets beyond whether an employee is an illicit drug
user;' 9 and (2) a testing administrator must actually watch an employee produce the
I1. Ayers categorizes drug testing as follows:
(1) "For cause" testing (individual employees are tested once the employer has a reasonable
suspicion as to that employee's use of illegal drugs); (2) events testing (employees involved
in a particular event, such as an accident, injury to another employee, discharge of a gun or
high-speed chase are subject to drug testing, as well as employees seeking transfers,
promotions and return from leaves of absence); (3) category testing (individuals belonging
to the category are tested by virtue of their participation: Critical Incident Response Team
(SWAT) members, bomb squad employees, organized crime unit and narcotics bureau
members); (4) drug treatment monitoring (employees in this group are tested after having
self-reported use, been found using drugs and/or entered treatment); (5) annual medical
evaluation testing (drug testing is often included as a component of annual physical fitness
examinations); (6) pre-employment testing, (applicants, once given a conditional offer of
employment, are subject to drug testing prior to commencing work); and (7) random testing
(although capable of other meanings, random testing refers to any employee drug testing
where the degree of suspicion concerning drug use is general and not specific to the
individual, and the testing does not fall into any of the other groupings; consequently, it may
involve testing the entire workforce en masse or selecting out persons to be tested by random
methods, with all employees having equal opportunity to ultimately be tested). Although
several of these topic areas have generated legal challenges, the most litigated area is random
testing.
Id. at 340-41.
" See, e.g.. Lovvorn, 846 F.2d at 1542; National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 176
(5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988). But cf. the dissenting justice in Lovvorn used Wyman
v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), to argue that when an employee "voluntarily" submits to urinalysis testing,
the fourth amendment is not violated according to Katz v. United States ("What a person knowingly exposes
to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection"). Lovvorn,
846 F.2d at 1552 (Guy, Jr., J., dissenting)(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). The
dissenting justice in Lovvorn also considered the submission to be "voluntary" because the employee could
have refused to undergo the testing; under the Wyman rational, the fact that loss of employment might result
would not change the "non-search into a search." Lovvorn, 846 F.2d at 1552-54 (Guy, Jr., J., dissenting).
" U.S. CONST. amend XIV. See also Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643
(1961) (exclusionary rule).
16 U.S. CONST. amend IV. The fourth amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons...against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated..."; see also Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925); Security & Law Enforcement Employees v. Carey, 737 F.2d 187, 201 (2d
Cir. 1984).
'7 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979); O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1499 (1987).
, Urinalysis a technique used to determine whether a person has been using drugs. The most common form
of urinalysis is the enzyme immunoassay technique (EMIT test). Miller, infra note 19, at 205. For a
discussion of how the EMIT test works, see id.
"9 Urine testing may disclose treatment for depression or epilepsy, diabetes, pregnancy, and the use of
prescribed medications. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 816 F.2d at 175-76. One commentator has
described urine as a "potential gold mine of information." Miller, Mandatory Urinalysis Testing and the
Privacy Rights of Subject Employees: Toward a General Rule of Legality under the Fourth Amendment, 48
U. Pn-r. L. REV. 201, 208 (1986).
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urine sample.' 20
Other topics generally discussed include the fourth amendment warrant
requirement and its exceptions, particularly the administrative search exception.2'
The main issue focuses on whether there should be a requirement of some "reason-
able suspicion" 22 before an employee is required to undergo urinalysis. 23 Another
issue which sometimes surfaces is the reliability of the tests.
2 4
PART II
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RANDOM DRUG TESTING AS APPLIED TO
POLICE OFFICERS AND FIRE FIGHTERS
Two recent federal circuit court of appeals decisions are worthy of discus-
sion.25 In Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n, the third circuit upheld a township's drug
20 Comment, supra note 5, at 1242. For a recital of one woman's account of her humiliating experience of
urinating while the test administrator bent down to watch the woman give the sample and use toilet paper
afterwards, See Comment, supra note 5, at 1249 n.55 (citing Siegel, Towarda New FederalRight to Privacy,
11 NOVA L. REV. 703, 703-04 (1987)) (emphasis in original)); "[F]ew activities in our society [are] more
personal or private than the passing of urine." Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 816 F.2d at 175. However,
there are ways to make this requirement less intrusive:
[One program] call[ed] for only indirect monitoring of the employee, the latter being
permitted to produce his urine sample behind a partition while the person administering the
test listens for the normal sounds of urination. Only if suspicion develops that the employee
has tried to tamper with the sample by virtue of the absence of the appropriate sounds from
behind the partition, or if the temperature of the sample given to the overseer does not seem
appropriate, will direct observation be required.
Comment, Random Drug Testing in the Government Sector: A Violation of Fourth Amendment Rights? 62
TUL. L. REV. 1373, 1385 n.72 (quoting Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 734
(S.D. Ga. 1986)). However, despite this laxity, the court still found the urinalysis testing to be highly intrusive
since the subjected employee's "off-duty conduct" was monitored. Am Fed'n, 651 F. Supp. at 732; see also
Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, in which a similar program was upheld because such programs "minimize
the intrusiveness of the search." Also, the program allowed the employee to list any medications taken and
to explain any circumstances under which the employee was legitimately exposed to illegal drugs; the list
and explanation are placed in a sealed envelope which "will not be opened unless the urine test is positive."
816 F.2d at 173-74.
2 See, e.g., Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986) (horse racing
industry); But cf Lovvorn, 846 F.2d at 1546 (administrative search exception not applicable to fire fighters).
The administrative search exception is usually applied when a warrantless periodic search is "necessary to
further a regulatory scheme..." Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600 (1981). Obtaining a warrant in this
situation is held to be unnecessary because the resulting delay would "unduly interfere" with the rationale
behind the search. N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (searching children in the school environment).
22 Reasonable suspicion is a lesser standard than probable cause. However, even the following do not even
constitute reasonable suspicion: "[r]umors of drug use, unreliable informant information, lack of investi-
gation or information without specific names of employees in the absence of an extremely compelling case
for testing, such as in a prison setting..." Ayers, supra note 11, at 347.
23 In Lovvorn, the court cited numerous upholding and striking down employee drug testing without any
reasonable suspicion. 846 F.2d at 1544-45.
24 For a discussion of the reliability of drug tests currently in use, See Comment, Random Drug Testing, supra
note 20, at 1390.
25 Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n, 850 F.2d 133; Lovvorn, 846 F.2d 1539. These two decisions discuss most
of the issues raised in the area of drug testing.
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testing program for police officers.26 The plan provided for mandatory random drug
testing and annual medical examination programs 7 The third circuit, relying on
Shoemaker v.Handel2 as controlling precedent, held that the drug testing programs
fell within the administrative search exception to the fourth amendment warrant
requirement.2 9
In Shoemaker, the court held that the administrative search exception applies
in heavily regulated industries.30 Shoemaker involved the horse racing industry. The
court upheld a drug testing plan which required jockeys to submit to daily breatha-
lyzers and random urinalysis.31 The court held that the horse racing industry's
"pervasive regulation...reduced the justifiable privacy expectations.... ,32
In Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n, the third circuit then concluded that the
police department was much more regulated 33 than the horse racing industry;
therefore, the police officers had lower expectations of privacy and the administra-
tive search exception applied to police as well.34 Although this comment urges that
the final result of Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n is correct (see Part III), the
reasoning behind the decision (i.e., the highly regulated industry exception) is
fundamentally flawed. The mere fact that an industry is highly regulated bears no
rational relationship to mandatory urinalysis. For example, the fact that the public
utilities industry is regulated in order to promote economic efficiency should not
justify mandatory urinalysis which is "not designed and do[es] not further the
purposes pursued by the regulations." 35 The mere fact that an industry is regulated
does not justify a lower standard of protection regarding an employee's right to
privacy.36 "Rather than focus on the amount of regulation in the industry or work
force, we believe it is necessary to understand why a particular industry is regulated
and why the drug tests have been initiated.'37 In Lovvorn, the sixth circuit charac-
terized the highly regulated industry approach as "simplistic and intellectually
indefensible." 38 The Lovvorn court used the O'Connor v. Ortega39 balancing
26 850 F.2d at 141.
21 Id. at 135.
28 795 F.2d 1136.
21 Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n, 850 F.2d at 141.30 Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142. Other examples of regulated industry cases include: Rushtond v. Nebraska
Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988) (nuclear plant employees); Nat'l Ass'n of Air Traffic
Specialists v. Dole, No. A87-073 unpublished slip op. (D.C. Alaska 1987) (air traffic controllers) (cited in
Lovvorn, 846 F.2d at 1545).
3" Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142.
32 d. See also Mack v. United States, 653 F. Supp. 70,75 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd, 814 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1987)
(FBI agents have diminished expectations of privacy in light of their positions as FBI agents).
33 Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n, 850 F.2d at 14 1.
34 Id.
11 Lo'vorn, 846 F.2d at 1546.
36 Id.
3' Id. (emphasis in original).
38 Id. at 1545.
39 O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. 1492.
Spring, 19891 COMMENTS
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approach instead. 41
Lovvorn involved a drug testing program for fire fighters. The sixth circuit
concluded that "there must be some evidence of significant department-wide drug
problem or individualized suspicion" before subjecting employees to urinalysis.4'
The court also felt that it must "inquir[e] into the harm that will result to society if
mandatory drug tests are not allowed into that industry. The higher the cost and the
more irretrievable the loss, the stronger the argument for finding reasonable the
initiation of a drug testing program."42 The Lovvorn court then concluded that a
drug-impaired fire fighter could impose a significant harm on society -possibly even
lost lives -but held that the probability of significant losses was much lower than with
"impaired air traffic controllers and nuclear plant employees who literally hold
thousands of lives in their hands every day." 43 As Part III of this comment will
demonstrate, the Lovvorn decision's reasoning is also flawed.
PART III
ANALYSIS
Public v. Private Employers
The biggest irony stemming from the arguments which oppose drug testing of
government employees is that only government testing is subject to fourth amend-
ment analysis. Private employers'4 actions do not constitute state action; therefore,
their actions do not trigger the fourth amendment restrictions. Consequently, the
government (this country's largest employer) has a severe disadvantage. "Private
employers who want to institute a drug testing program may do so and need not
concern themselves with the fourth amendment," 45 but the government must con-
sider the employee's fourth amendment rights.
If the government used the urinalysis results to initiate criminal proceedings 46
(rather than testing only in its official capacity as an employer) the arguments
opposing random drug testing would prevail because the possibility of loss of
freedom (resulting from incarceration) is a much more serious deprivation than loss
of employment, and therefore is more deserving of constitutional protection.
However, proponents of government employee drug testing do not advocate the
o Lovvorn, 846 F.2d at 1543.
4' Id. at 1547.
42 Id. at 1546.
41 Id. at 1547.
4For an analysis of drug testing by private employers, see Comment, Employee Drug Testing -- Issues Facing
Private Sector Employers, 65 N.C.L. REV. 832 (1987).
41 Loviorn, 846 F.2d at 1551 (Guy, Jr., J., dissenting).
'6 But cf., the Supreme Court has stated "it would be anomalous to say that the individual and his private
property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal
behavior...." O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1497 (quoting N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 335).
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:4
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initiation of criminal proceedings,47 but rather, only such consequences as occur with
private employers (e.g., termination of employment). Two decisions are of particu-
lar importance. First, in Katz v. United States,48 the Supreme Court held that "the
Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional 'right to
privacy."' 49 Therefore, not all instrusions into privacy expectations are protected by
the fourth amendment. 50 Second, in Wyman v. James,5' a woman refused to allow
a caseworker to enter her home; entrance was a condition precedent to receiving
financial assistance. The court held that the right of refusal was synonymous with
consent, even though refusal would mean forfeiting Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) relief (her only source of income).52 The court held that the
caseworker visits did not constitute a fourth amendment search. 53
Weighing the Conflicting Interests
The Lovvorn court stated: "We do not believe society would sanction a grant
of power to the government that would have the effect of enabling the government
to require a urine test of any individual it had legally stopped, even if it had no
reasonable suspicion of drug usage." 54  If the Lovvom court is so confident
regarding public policy in this area, why not leave it to society to decide through the
legislature? 55 "The American people are not opposed to drug testing of employees.
[One] survey.. .indicates that sixty-nine percent of responding employees favored
periodic drug testing of employees. Eighty-one percent said that they would be
'willing to submit to a test even if [allowed] to refuse.'" 56
The Lovvorn court concluded that there must be "some evidence of a
significant department-wide drug problem or individualized suspicion" 57 before
random drug-testing could be justified. The problem with this reasoning is that:
[U]rinalysis essentially becomes a tool of confirmation rather than
discovery. Therefore, an employer would be forced to resort to other
more traditional methods of investigation such as interrogation and
surveillance. Not only would such tactics be more intrusive, they would
also presumably be subject to constitutional constraints. 58
4' Safeguards could also be enacted -- "The employer simply needs to inform the testing laboratory to
disclose only whether an employee is using illicit drugs, not whether she is pregnant." Comment, supra note
5, at 1248.
4 389 U.S. 347.
49 Id. at 350.
50 Comment, supra note 5, at 1250-5 1.
51 400 U.S. 309.52 1d. at 315-318.
5 3 
Id.
4 Lovvorn, 846 F.2d at 1542 (emphasis added).
11 Accord, Comment, supra note 5, at 1268.
56 Id. (footnotes omitted).
51 Lovvorn, 846 F.2d at 1547.
18 Id. at 1561 (Guy, Jr., J., dissenting).
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The Lovvorn court concluded that police officers and fire fighters are not
comparable to "air traffic controllers and nuclear plant employees who literally hold
thousands of lives in their hands every day." 59 This argument is unconvincing.
Although one mistake by an impaired air traffic controller or nuclear plant employee
could ultimately kill a large number of people, this fact does not imply that protecting
the lives of a smaller number of people is less important than protecting a police
officer's privacy. The risk of erroneous deprivation of one life should outweigh a
person's privacy interest (regarding urinalysis). The inquiry should not be how many
lives are at stake, but rather, what is the probability of any lives being taken
accidently. Police officers and fire fighters "are often called upon to rapidly respond
to life-threatening emergencies." 60 "Fighting fires is perhaps the most dangerous
and hazardous of all professions.' ,61 Police officers carry guns at all times, both on-
duty and off-duty.6 2 Police officers "exercis[e] the most awesome and dangerous
power that a democratic state possesses with respect to its residents - the power to
use lawful force to arrest and detain them.' '63 Police officers are sometimes
permitted to use deadly force.' Police officers and fire fighters "are frequently
required to operate emergency vehicles at high speeds, thereby creating an even
greater risk to themselves and to the public if their performance is impaired by the
use of drugs.' 6
5
Another issue is public image. 66 "Police officers are sworn to uphold and
enforce the laws ...By using illegal drugs, police officers expose themselves to
compromise, thereby seriously jeopardizing their effectiveness as law enforcement
agents.' '67 It seems ironic that a police officer who uses illegal drugs (and may even
be on drugs at the time) can arrest another person for using illegal drugs. "The need
in a democratic society for public confidence, respect and approbation" of police
officers is great.68
Effects of Drugs
The Lovvorn court admitted that controlled substances, such as marijuana, can
have an adverse effect on one's "perception, decision-making time, short-term
memory, motor skills, and judgment.' '69 The court then admitted that "[fWire
fighters so affected become a risk to themselves, their fellow fire fighters, and those
depending on them for rescue.' 70
59 Id. at 1547.
6 Id. at 1559 (Guy, Jr., J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 1544.
62 See e.g., Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n 850 F.2d at 139-41.
61 Id. at 14 1.
Lovvorn, 846 F.2d at 1559 (Guy, Jr., J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 1558 (Guy, Jr., J., dissenting).
I Id. at 1559 (Guy, Jr., J., dissenting).
67 Id.
"8 Policeman's Benev. Ass'n, 850 F.2d at 141.
6' Lovvorn, 846 F.2d at 1544.
70 Id.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:4
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The effects of drugs can be grouped into three categories: (I) physiological
(effect on the body), (2) psychoactive (effect on feelings, mood, and behavior), and
(3) adverse and/or toxic reactions (effects due to an unusual sensitivity to the drug,
excessive doses, or chronic long-term use).7 "Large doses [of cocaine] can cause
depression of the CNS [central nervous system] either as a result of cocaine-induced
convulsions or as the immediate effect of high concentrations of cocaine reaching the
brain. ' 7 2 "Due to the vasoconstrictive action of [cocaine], blood pressure rises
when cocaine is first introduced into the body and returns to normal as the effects
wear off. Small doses slow the heart rate, moderate doses increase it. Large doses
may result in cardiac failure due to a direct toxic reaction on the heart." 73 Cocaine
can cause euphoria, sexual stimulation, and a reduction in fatigue.74 "In general, the
larger the dose, the more pronounced the effects. But large chronic doses usually
lead to adverse results: euphoria may turn into anxiety,paranoia and hallucinations;
sexual stimulation to impotency; lucidity to confusion; and the lessening of fatigue
to insomnia." 75 Depending on the dosage taken and the individuals involved,
cocaine can cause people to feel a change in their personalities so that the individuals
"[react] more sharply to criticism, [feel] more impatient when faced with minor
problems, and in general [feel] slightly on edge."76 If an individual exceeds his or
her limit, warning signs appear: "cold perspiration, excessive sweating, pallor, feel-
ings of anxiety, exhibitions of aggressive behavior, insomnia, impotency, and
feelings of heaviness in the limbs." 77
As stated above, these reactions do not always surface because the effects of
cocaine vary with the individual and the dosage taken. However, considering the
possibility that even one of these symptoms could occur in a fire fighter or an armed
police officer, these public safety workers themselves should realize that urinalysis
is necessary (thereby reducing any reasonable expectation or privacy). "The public
wants and rightfully expects the policeman's finger on the trigger to be as steady as
the jockey's hand on the bridle.' '78 The scenario in the Introductory paragraph of this
comment shows that there are limitless possibilities with respect to a drug-impaired
police officer wrongfully taking the life of another. Even though a police officer
might only be responsible for a few lives (as opposed to a nuclear plant employee), 79
when one considers the possible number of drug-impaired police officers nation-
wide, the number of lives jeopardized could also be staggering.
If the effects of drugs were disputed, then it would be easier to conclude that
mandatory urinalysis should be prohibited. However, when the effects of drugs are
71 R. ASHLEY, supra note 2, at 148.
12 Id. at 151-52.
73 Id. at 152.
74 Id. at 155.
75 Id. (emphasis added).
76 Id. at 156. (emphasis added).
77 Id. at 166.
78 Lovvorn, 846 F.2d at 1556 (Guy, Jr., J., dissenting).
71 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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well-known, it is difficult to conclude that a person's interest in keeping private his
use of illegal drugs private outweighs the public's interest in ensuring that innocent
lives are not jeopardized. Illegal drug use is not a victimless crime. If proper
safeguards are taken,80 in conjunction with imposing civil and criminal sanctions for
non-compliance, then the only disclosure necessary is whether or not the employee
is using illegal drugs. Whether the employee is epileptic, diabetic, pregnant, or
taking other prescribed medications may properly be protected.8' As in all consti-
tutional questions, there is no right answer. However, the most important interests
must prevail, and the protection of human life is definitely one of the most important
interests in our society.
Drug Testing as a Deterrent
Lost lives are not the only consequence of drug use on the job. One can
hypothesize countless situations which could result in a deprivation of an individ-
ual's liberty. For example, if a drug-impaired police officer becomes "more
impatient when faced with a minor problem" 82 such as starting a fight while merely
giving a traffic ticket or investigating a complaint for disturbing the peace. At the
trial, it usually comes down to a credibility contest between the defendant and the
police officer. A jury might believe the police officer and convict the defendant,
even though the police officer initiated the fight. Of course, this is just a hypothetical
- but obviously, not far-fetched.
Police officers and fire fighters are given enormous power over the lives of
others; such power carries with it enormous responsibilities. Remaining drug-free
is one of them. In view of this enormous power over others, it is indeed difficult to
sympathize with a police officer's loss of privacy when he submits to mandatory
drug testing.
Some courts require a reasonable suspicion of department-wide or an indi-
vidualized problem of drug abuse.83 However, the problem with this argument is that
"[u]rinalysis essentially becomes a tool of confirmation rather than discovery." 84
One of the most important advantages of drug testing is "deterrence." "The threat
of periodic drug testing... is the motivator to keep public safety officers drug free."'85
The dissenting justice in Nat'l Treasury8 6 argues that the drug testing program
involved in that decision was not an effective deterrent for two reasons. First, the
80 See supra note 47.
8 See supra note 20.
82 See supra text accompanying note 76.
83 Lovvorn, 846 F.2d at 1547.
84 Id. at 1561 (Guy, Jr., J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying note 58.
85 Id. at 1555 (Guy, Jr., J., dissenting). The dissenting justice analogized 'drug testing as a deterrent' to
periodic qualification on the firing range. The purpose of firearm qualification "is not primarily to find non-
qualifying officers but, rather, to ensure that the officers will practice adequately so that they can pass the
test." Id.8 816 F.2d 170.
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plan required testing of employees who were seeking "sensitive" positions but did
not require testing or retesting of current sensitive-position employees. Second, the
employees were given five days' advance notice of the test; therefore, employees
could stop using drugs immediately and test negative.87 These reasons are faulty
because some deterrence is better than no deterrence. Moreover, it is those
employees who cannot stop using drugs for just five days that we should be
especially concerned about. Also, if the courts begin to consistently uphold these
programs, the deterrent effect will increase because employers will implement more
of them - with provisions for retesting employees currently in sensitive positions.
Notification is a beneficial requirement; it helps cut down on the unsuspected
intrusiveness. In Capua v. City of Plainfield," a surprise urinalysis test was given
to fire fighters.89 Testing agents locked all of the fire station's doors and awakened
the fire fighters up at 7:00 a.m.90 All of the fire fighters were coerced to submit to
the testing process. 9' Those fire fighters who tested positive were terminated. 92
Clearly these tactics are unnecessary. Perhaps the notification period could be
shortened (e.g., three days), but a surprise,forced test is definitely an intrusion upon
an individual's dignity. At the very least, a five-day notice acts as a deterrent to some
people which, as stated above, is better than no deterrent at all.
Cost Associated with Employee Drug Use
A critical concern of proponents of drug testing is 'cost.' "[A]t least 20
million Americans use marijuana/hashish. Approximately four million Americans
are cocaine users, and two million are using other stimulants." 93 Between 3% and
7% of American employees use illegal drugs regularly; "much of this use is
occurring on the job, or at least at a time when such use adversely affects job
performance." 94 Lost productivity, accident-related costs, health care costs, poor
workmanship and employee theft are results of employee drug use which costs the
United States $33 billion per year.95 Employees who abuse alcohol or drugs are
absent from work sixteen times more often, and are in accidents four times more
often, than employees not using drugs.96 Accidents resulting from drug-impaired
emergency workers can impose liability costs on municipalities under 42 U.S.C. §
87 Id. at 184 (Hill, J., dissenting).
1 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986)
89Id. at 1511
9 Id.
91 Id.92 Id. at 1512.
93 Comment, supra note 5, at 1239 (footnotes omitted).
I Miller, supra note 19 at 203 (citing Schreier, A Survey of Drug Abuse in Organizations, 62 PERSONNEL J.
478, 478-79 (1983)).
95 Id. (citing Nat'l L.J., Apr. 7, 1986, at 1, col. 2.).
9 Quayle, American Productivity: The Devastating Effect of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse, 38 Am.
PSYCHOLOGIST 454, 455 (1983); See also lmwinkelried, Some Preliminary Thoughts on the Wisdom of
Governmental Prohibition or Regulation of Employee Urinalysis Testing, II NOVA L. REV. 563,565 (1987).
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1983. 97 Consequently, municipalities nationwide are in financial trouble98 and have
a "strong financial interest" in reducing accidents and associated costs.99 Employ-
ers could be liable to fellow employees and third parties injured by drug-impaired
employees "as well as to customers injured by defective products produced by
impaired employees."'
00
For those skeptical of whether drug testing has any beneficial value," [alt least
two case studies of particular corporations have concluded that employee assistance
programs incorporating urinalysis testing enhanced job efficiency and markedly
reduced sickness, disability, and accident rates."1 0' As stated above, even some
deterrence is better than no deterrence.
CONCLUSION
Drug abuse is a serious problem in our society. Drug-impaired employees are
a danger to themselves, fellow employees, and the public at large. 102 Much drug use
"occur[s] on the job, or at least at a time when such use adversely affects job
performance." 103 Drug use costs the United States billions of dollars per year in lost
productivity and accident-related costs. °4 Studies have shown that drug testing
programs effectively reduce these costs.0 5
Police officers and fire fighters are in hazardous professions, and innocent
lives could be taken accidently if these public safety workers are drug-impaired. The
problem with requiring a "reasonable suspicion" 106 before testing an employee is
that the testing becomes an after-the-fact confirmation rather than a deterrent.
The inquiry should not be how many lives are at stake, but rather, what is the
probability of any life being taken accidently. The probability of lives being taken
accidently by drug-impaired fire fighters and armed police officers appears tremen-
dous.
1 Lovvorn, 846 F.2d at 1559 (Guy, Jr., J., dissenting).
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 This same consequence could be imposed on the government as well as private employers. Employer
liability would be based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Note, Mandatory Drug Testing: Balancing
the Interests, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 297, 299 (1988) (citing Bible, Screening Workers for Drugs: The
Constitutional Implications of Urine Testing in Public Employment, 24 AM. Bus. L. J. 309, 315-16 (1986)).
101 Miller, supra note 19, at 204 (citing Effect of Alcohol and Drug Abuse on Productivity: Joint Hearing
Before the Senate Subcommittee on Alcohol and Drug Abuse and the Senate Subcommittee on Employment
and Productivity, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1982) (statement of William Mayer, M.D., Administrator, U.S.
Public Health Service)).
102 Lovvorn, 846 F.2d at 1544.
03 Miller, supra note 19 at 203. See supra text accompanying note 94.
104 Id. See supra text accompanying note 95.
' Id. at 204. See supra text accompanying note 101.
'06 Lovvorn, 846 F.2d at 1543.
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The two most controversial aspects of drug testing'0 7 can be greatly mitigated.
First, regarding the disclosure of personal information other than whether the
employee is using drugs (e.g., epilepsy, pregnancy, etc.), an independent agency can
be employed.'0 This independent agency would be required to disclose only
whether or not the employee is using illicit drugs.'0 9 If the agency violates this
requirement, criminal and civil sanctions could be imposed - both against the agency
and the employer. Second, regarding the requirement that the testing agent actually
watch the employee urinate, a partition could be used. " The agent would listen for
normal sounds of urination and check the temperature of the urine sample."I' If it
appears that the employee has tampered with the urine sample, then direct observa-
tion would be required." 12
In summation, given the enormous potential for loss of innocent lives, police
officers and fire fighters should be required to submit to drug testing even in the
absence of a "reasonable suspicion." The value of the potential lost lives far
outweighs any infringement on the police officers' and fire fighters' right to privacy
resulting from mandatory drug testing.
POSTSCRIPT
On March 21, 1989, as this volume was being printed, the Supreme Court
decided National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab."3 The Court weighed the
public interest against the individual's right to privacy and held that "suspicionless
testing of employees who apply for promotion to positions directly involving the
interdiction of illegal drugs, or to positions which require the incumbent to carry a
firearm, is reasonable."" ' In support of its holding, the Court cited the reasons
advocated in this comment, namely: the potential loss of citizens' lives due to
"impaired perception and judgment" in the use of deadly force,' "5 the test results
would not be used in a criminal prosecution,"' 6 procedures were implemented to
safeguard against unwarranted disclosure of personal medical information,' '7 drug
testing programs do deterdrug use,' "and the "diminished expectation of privacy by
virtue of the special, and obvious, physical and ethical demands of those posi-
tions."119
1o7 See supra text accompanying nn. 18-20.
'0 See supra note 47.
109 Id.
o See supra note 20.
Id.
112 Id.
"- 109 S.Ct. 1384 (1989). See supra note 20.
''




7 Id. at 1394 n.2
"IId. at 1396.
"
9 /d. at 1397-98.
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The case involved the United States Customs Service, but would be applicable
to all police officers because they are required to carry a firearm. The reasoning
seems equally applicable to fire fighters who, "by virtue of the special, and obvious,
physical... demands" of their positions, should have a diminished expectation of
privacy. The Supreme Court seems very concerned with the current drug problem
in our society, and therefore future drug testing programs are likely to be upheld.
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